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Reconsidering Zeus’ Order:
The Reconciliation of Apollo and Hermes1

ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the Homeric Hymn to Hermes explores
competing ways of approaching the world through the figures of Hermes
and Apollo. Apollo’s reliance on the established world, partially marked
by the knowledge of εἰδέναι , is insufficient in understanding Hermes, who
aligns himself with the flexible capacity of νόος . Whereas Apollo eliminates
his rivals in order to establish himself permanently, Hermes exploits unexplored potentials in order to create space alongside the established gods in
the Olympian order. Ultimately, the newly forged friendship of Apollo and
Hermes helps us understand the nature of Zeus more fully.

I. Introduction
The presence of Apollo in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes may
seem intrusive in a hymn designed to honor the god Hermes. Making
his first appearance in line 185, Apollo occupies the stage alone for
roughly ten percent of the lines, and he shares the stage with Hermes
for the remaining roughly sixty percent. Several scholars have observed
this peculiarity, and a variety of approaches to this dilemma have been
explored. 2 In this paper, I will argue that the hymnist of HH Hermes
focuses on the relationship between Hermes and Apollo in order to
explore two competing ways of interacting with the world. Whereas
he strongly ties Apollo to a world of preexisting factual information,
especially by means of reference to seeing and the knowledge of the
Greek term εἰδέναι (literally “to have seen”), he uses Hermes to push
us to embrace alternate worlds created by his inventiveness, made
possible through a νόος (“mind”) well suited to new ways of understanding. 3 Through that inventiveness, Hermes not only brings change
to the physical world, but also to the relationships that exist among
the Olympians themselves, particularly those of Apollo and Zeus.
The Homeric Hymns are an ideal place to explore the tensions
of the Olympian system. As J. Clay has demonstrated, the poetry of
Hesiod works out the turbulent rise to power of Zeus, and the poetry
1
I follow M. L. West, Homeric Hymns, Homeric Apocrypha, Lives of Homer
(Cambridge 2003) for the text of HH Apollo and HH Hermes. All translations of
Greek are my own.
2
J. Clay (The Politics of Olympus [London 2006] 100–103) has an overview of
scholarly approaches to this contest. In addition to Clay, S. Johnston (“Myth, Festival, and Poet: The Homeric Hymn to Hermes and Its Performative Context,” CP 97
[2002] 109–32, and “‘Initiation’ in Myth, ‘Initiation’ in Practice: The Homeric Hymn
to Hermes and its Performative Context” in Initiation in Ancient Greek Rituals and
Narratives: New Critical Perspectives [New York 2003] 155–80) has explored connections between HH Hermes and Greek initiatory practices.
3
Throughout the discussion of HH Hermes, when I make reference to Apollo, I
am referring to Apollo as he appears in this hymn. References to Apollo in connection with HH Hermes are not meant to be an all-encompassing reading of Apollo in
Greek thought. I heed J. Clay’s (“Tendenz and Olympian Propoganda in the Homeric
Hymn to Apollo” in J. Solomon, ed., Apollo: Origins and Influences [Tucson 1994]
23–36) suggestion that “Apollo is a complex, even ambiguous, figure, multifaceted
rather than monolithic” (25).
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of Homer explores the way that the world works once Zeus’ rule has
become stabilized. In the gap between these two (theogonic and epic
poetry), there is space in which the problems of the Olympian order are
worked out.4 In the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, when Apollo is presented
with an opponent who threatens to destabilize the order he wishes to
impose on the cosmos (e.g. Pytho or Telphousa), he eliminates them
and takes their names. In the HH Hermes, we are presented with another way for a god to gain recognition among the Olympians.5 Rather
than destroying his opponents, Hermes allows Apollo to hold onto his
τιμαί so long as he is willing to join in friendship. Through his own
inventiveness, Hermes is able to open up parallel spaces within the
established cosmos. As a result of Hermes’ exploits, we are reminded
of the importance of thinking about the Greek pantheon as a dynamic
system in which our understanding of the cosmos comes from the
complementary and competing attributes of the Olympian gods. 6
The competing and complementary qualities of εἰδέναι and νόος as
ways of understanding our world provide nice parallels to the relationship between Apollo and Hermes. It will be useful to discuss briefly
the relationship between these two terms in archaic Greek poetry before
turning to the Homeric Hymns in particular. Following this discussion,
I will examine episodes from HH Apollo in which Apollo shares key
characteristics of the knowledge of εἰδέναι. I will then argue that the
hymnist of HH Hermes picks up on these qualities of Apollo, aligning him with εἰδέναι’s emphasis on the past. In contrast, the hymnist
aligns Hermes with νόος in order to highlight his ability to beguile
Clay (above, n.2) 15.
Whether or not the hymnist of HH Hermes would be familiar with HH Apollo is
irrelevant to my argument. It seems reasonable to assume that some aspects of Apollo
that we can glimpse in HH Apollo might be generally applied to Apollo in Greek thinking. In HH Hermes, Apollo has been used as a caricature against which the hymnist
can contrast his main subject. Johnston 2003 (above, n.2) has a succinct summary of
scholarship on the issue of the dating of HH Hermes (174 n.5). G. Kirk (“The Homeric
Hymns” in The Cambridge History of Classical Literature Volume 1: Early Greek Poetry
[Cambridge 1985] 69–75), R. Janko (Homer, Hesiod, and the Hymns [Cambridge 1982]),
and S. Eitrem (“Der homerische Hymnus an Hermes,” Philologus 65 [1906] 248–82)
place the date of the hymn sometime between the late sixth and early fourth century,
with most opinions giving preference for a dating at the end of the sixth or beginning
of the fifth century. Recently, R. Johnston and D. Mulroy (“The Hymn to Hermes and
the Athenian Altar of the Twelve Gods,” CW 103 [2009] 3–16) have made the argument that we should follow N. Brown’s (Hermes the Thief: The Evolution of a Myth
[Madison, Wis., 1947]) suggestion that the hymn be dated to the founding of the Altar
of the Twelve Gods in Athens in 522/521 b . c . e ., connecting Hermes’ journey through
Pylos with Peisistratid ancestry from Neleus, the father of Nestor.
6
See D. Jaillard (Configurations d’Hermès: Une “théogonie hermaïque” [Liège
2007]): Si les pantheons ne sont reductibles ni à des amalgemes arbitraries ni à des
structures statiques à l’intérieur desquelles chaque divinité occuperait une place prédéfinie, il faut tenter de comprendre comment s’opèrent, en leur sein, mouvements et
déplacements, comment ils émergent et se recomposent au gré des communautés de
dieux qui tissent l’histoire des cités (“If pantheons are not reducible either to arbitrary
mixtures or to static structures within which each divinity occupies a predefined place,
one must attempt to understand how movements and displacements take place within
them, how they emerge and are reformed to the liking of the communities of gods
which weave the history of cities” 16).
4
5
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the faculty of sight and to insist on a world of multiple, simultaneous
possibilities. 7 In the interaction between Apollo, driven by the visual
knowledge associated with εἰδέναι, and Hermes, trusting in the ability of his ν όος to challenge the permanence of the existing world, the
hymnist presents us with a fuller understanding Zeus.
II. εἰδέναι and νόος/νοεῖν
If we look across archaic Greek poetry, we find that εἰδέναι is connected with visual perception, rooted in past experience, and maintains
an enduring gnomic quality. As has often been observed, εἰδέναι is
the perfect form of seeing (ἰδεῖν), and there remains a strong connection between this kind of knowledge and the visual in archaic poetry.8
Semonides (7.13–14) describes his dog woman as one who wishes to
know ( εἰδέναι) everything and, as a result, looks into ( παπταίνουσα)
everything. Homer provides a reminder of the importance of vision in
the knowledge of εἰδέναι by combining forms of it with the adverb
σάφα (clearly). Of the twenty-one occurrences of this adverb in Homer,
fifteen occur with forms of εἰδέναι. The woman who informs the suitors about Penelope’s trick is one who “knows it clearly” (Od.2.108
and 24.144: σάφα ᾔδη) because she has seen Penelope unraveling the
weaving. Aias boasts to Hektor that “he will clearly know” (Il.7.226:
σάφα εἴσεαι ) the bravery of the Danaans as a result of the duel. In
other words, Aias promises that he will demonstrate what a Greek can
do in combat so Hektor may come to know what Greek bravery is.
There is also the sense that humans are limited in this kind
of knowledge as a result of limited scope of vision. Regarding the
invocation of the Muses in Il. 2.485–486, B. Snell notes, “The goddesses are superior to men for the simple reason that they are always
on hand, and have seen everything, and know it now—both notions
are contained in the ἴστε of line 485 and in the ἴδµεν of line 486.” 9
The omnipresence of the Muses allows them to witness firsthand
what mortals cannot, and in this way their inspiration enables poets
to have greater perspective.
We should see the unpredictability of the future in similar terms.
Semonides (1.4) and Solon (13.65) both speak of our inability to know
it because of this unpredictability. In order to further highlight the
limited scope of human knowledge, Semonides draws a comparison
between humans and cattle. Fixated on the ground for food, cattle are
narrowly focused in their present pursuits. Likewise in comparison
with the gods, humans are narrowly focused on the pursuits of a brief
span of time, incapable of appreciating the full scope of Zeus’ will.
7
Hermes’ insistence on viewing the world as one of multiple, simultaneous possibilities may help us understand why the hymnist uses humor throughout the hymn.
For a fuller description of this, see C. Bungard, “Lies, Lyres, and the Laughter of
Surplus Potential in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes,” Arethusa 44 [2011] 143–65).
8
See Il. 2.485–486, Od. 13.239, Theogony 370, Works and Days 187, HH Demeter
133, HH Hermes 376, HH Aphrodite 207.
9
B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought,
tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York 1960) 136–37.
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Homer poses storytelling as avenue to circumvent some of the
limitations of human visual perception. Through storytelling, humans
may come to know things beyond what they can observe. In Iliad,
book 20, Aineias replies to Akhilleus’ taunt,
ἴδμεν δ᾽ ἀλλήλων γενεήν, ἴδμεν δὲ τοκῆας,
πρόκλυτ᾽ ἀκούοντες ἔπεα θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων
ὄψει δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἄρ πω σὺ ἐμοὺς ἴδες οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐγὼ σούς .

				

(20.203–205)

We know each other’s lineage. We know our parents
since we have heard the renowned words of mortal
men, but by sight, you have not yet seen mine, nor
I yours.
Aineias claims to know (ἴδμεν ) Akhilleus’ family through stories, but
he feels the need to qualify what he means by ἴδμεν . Though these
two warriors have never seen ( ὄψει) each other’s ancestors in person,
Aineias claims that stories are a suitable replacement for firsthand
experience. When autopsy is not possible because of constraints of
space and time, the works of the poets provide a window through
which one may come to know through seeing.
This leads to the next main aspect of the knowledge associated
with εἰδέναι, namely the importance of the past. Mimnermos speaks of
the joy of youth that comes from our lack of experience of/knowing
(εἰδότες) either good or bad (2.4). Arkhilokhos can lead the dithyramb
because he has experience/knows how to do so (120.2). Sappho calls
upon her departing lover to reflect on their past because she knows
how she was cared for (94.8). In the Iliad, both Athena and Hera seek
to assuage Zeus by acknowledging that they know/have experienced
his superior strength (8.30 and 8.463). Right before the quote above,
Aineias tells Akhilleus that it is futile to try to frighten him because
he knows/has experience in taunting words (20.201), a line echoed
shortly afterwards by Hektor (20.432). In all of these examples, we
see that the knowledge of εἰδέναι reflects upon the past’s impact on
the present. We can draw a link between the past and the present
through εἰδέναι, and, as will become apparent shortly, there is a sense
of permanence in this linkage.
Several uses of εἰδέναι introduce gnomic statements, implying a
stable and timeless quality to this knowledge. Arkhilokhos observes
that the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog one big thing (201).
Though there may be countless iterations of foxes and hedgehogs,
they remain predictable in their defining qualities. Alkaios twice uses
εἰδέναι with perennial knowledge. He tells his addressee that one ought
to throw gifts to prostitutes into the sea, and if someone does not
know this, then he can persuade him so (117b.26–28). Similarly, he
expresses his sure knowledge ( οἶδ’ ἦ μὰν ) that if one moves gravel,
he will get a headache (344). In both instances, the content of what
one knows remains constant and unchanging over time. Once this
knowledge comes into being, it persists through time.
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We can see this sense of fixed knowledge through several uses of

εἰδέναι in the Iliad. As Agamemnon responds to the broken truce, he
claims to know (4.163: οἶδα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν ) that Troy,

Priam, and his people will perish. Hektor later echoes Agamemnon word
for word (6.447) as he explains to his wife why he must go out and
fight. Finally, Akhilleus asks Xanthos about the point in prophesying
death since he knows it his fate to die on the plains of Troy (19.421).
As with the gnomic uses of εἰδέναι, we find in these examples an
unchanging link between the past and the future. As the fates of Troy
and Akhilleus have been fixed in the past for the future, so too the
knowledge of them remains unchanging until they have come to pass, at
which point they continue as events to be understood through εἰδέναι.
As we turn to thinking about the kind of understanding associated
with νόος/νοεῖν, it will be useful first to contemplate a passage from
the Iliad where νόος/νοεῖν and εἰδέναι are used in close association.
As Hera goads Zeus in the opening book of the poem, she complains
that he hides his plans from her, refusing to reveal them through speech
(1.541–543). Zeus chastises her for desiring to know all of his plans
(1.545–546) before promising her that she will be the first to know any
thoughts that are right for gods to hear (1.547–548). He then ends by
warning her about asking about plans that he wishes to devise apart from
the gods using his νόος (1.549: νοῆσαι). In contrast to εἰδέναι that takes
in publicly visible information, νόος may conceal the understanding of
a person from outsiders. 10 There is often a visual component to understanding connected with νόος, but, as B. Snell has argued, “noeîn does
not involve the knowledge acquired through sight, as eidénai . . . but
instead the significance of something that becomes clear upon looking
at it.”11 To νοεῖν someone or something is an act of decoding information that has been encoded by another. For example, understanding a
divine omen is not simply an act of observation, but rather an act that
involves the decoding of several pieces of information in conjunction
with each other. Observing a flying bird is insufficient without taking
into account other conditions (number or kinds of birds, direction, etc.). 12
10
Similarly at Iliad 16.19, Akhilleus asks Patroklos to reveal his angst, not hiding it in his νόος , so they might both know ( εἴδομεν ).
11
B. Snell, “The Forging of a Language for Science in Ancient Greece,” CJ 56
(1960) 53. For an overview of the study of νόος, see B. Snell, Lexikon des Frühgriechiscen Epos, vol. 3 (Göttingen 2004). For more discussion on νόος as a faculty
that analyzes the visual in order to direct response, see also K. von Fritz (“Nous, Noein,
and Their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy [Excluding Anaxagoras]: Part II. The
Post-Parmenidean Period,” CP 41 [1946] 12–34), T. Krischer (“ Nόος νοεῖν, νόημα ,”
Glotta 62 [1984] 141–49), and J. Barnouw (Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence:
Deliberation and Signs in Homer’s Odyssey [Lanham 2004]). For more on the connection
between νόος and vision see K. von Fritz (“Noos and Noein in the Homeric Poems,”
CP 38 [1943] 79–93), S. Darcus (“How a Person relates to νόος in Homer, Hesiod, and
the Greek Lyric Poets,” Glotta 58 [1980] 39–44), and S. Sullivan (“Noos and Vision:
Five Passages in the Greek Lyric Poets,” SO 6 [1988] 7–17 and “The Mind and Heart
of Zeus in Homer and the Homeric Hymns,” ABG 37 [1994] 101–26).
12
For more on νόος , signs, and decoding/encoding, see G. Nagy, “Sēma and
Noēsis: Some Illustrations,” Arethusa 16 (1983) 35–55.
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We can see the work of νόος in encoding and decoding through
a comparison of Antinoos and Alkinoos from the Odyssey. As J.
Lesher notes, the Odyssey is especially marked by moments in which
characters see, but fail to notice, recognize, or realize what it is
that they truly see. 13 Despite several warnings, Antinoos ( ἀντί–νόος )
dismisses the danger that looms over him in Odysseus’ household.
After Odysseus strings the bow, he nods to his son who understands
the significance of the nod and grabs his sword (21.431–434). Odysseus makes a proclamation and takes aim at Antinoos. In contrast
to Telemakhos, Antinoos is about to enjoy a drink, unaware of his
impending death (22.11–12).
Alkinoos ( ἀλκή–νόος ) is the only one who notices ( ἐνόησεν )
Odysseus weeping at the song of Demodokos (Od. 8.533). Blessed
with a stout νόος , he is able to decode the significance of Odysseus’
weeping. He recognizes that the mirthful banquet may be threatened by
Odysseus’ grief, and as a result, he bids Demodokos to stop playing
the lyre. He bids his guest to become the focal point of entertainment, urging him to reveal his story. Through an application of νόος,
Alkinoos is able to bring to light hidden information so that it may
become known to his people. 14
In addition to encoding and decoding, I would suggest that νόος has
a markedly future orientation. Rather than representing understanding
that is rooted in the past or is timeless in nature, νόος aims at specific
goals that may be of temporary usefulness. Homer twice speaks of νόος
as something that can achieve its τέλος (of Peleus vowing Akhilleus’
lock to Sperkhios in Il. 23.149 and the suitors laying out a plan in
Od. 22.215). Hesiod describes the journey of the Argonauts and the
abduction of Medea as the fulfillment of Zeus’ νόος (Theogony 1002:
μεγάλου δὲ Διὸς νόος ἐξετελεῖτο ), a phrase echoed by HH Hermes
10. Unlike εἰδέναι, which makes meaning of completed actions, νόος
starts from an imperfect point and aims at a specific goal.
Because it is future-oriented, νόος lacks the fixity that we can
associate with εἰδέναι . In her discussions of νόος in Homer, Hesiod,
and the Homeric Hymns, S. Sullivan has noted several instances where
flexibility and changeability are an essential component. 15 I would
draw particular attention to Works and Days 483–484 where Hesiod
suggests that the νόος of Zeus is difficult to νοῆσαι (“to process
with the mind”) because it is ἄλλοτε δ’ ἀλλοῖος (“one thing at one
time, another at another”). In a fragment of the Thebaid, Amphiarus
encourages his son to have the νόος of the octopus so he might adapt
his νόος to the people that he visits. We see through these examples
that understanding that comes from νόος is more connected to the
13
J. Lesher, “Perceiving and Knowing in the Iliad and Odyssey,” Phronesis 26
(1981) 14.
14
D. Frame (The Myth of Return in Early Greek Epic [New Haven 1978]) suggests that νόος comes from the root *nes-, roughly meaning “return to life and light.”
15
S. Sullivan, “The Psychic Term Noos in Homer and the Homeric Hymns,” SIFC
7 (1989) 152–95, and “The Psychic Term Nóos in the Poetry of Hesiod,” Glotta 68
(1990) 68–85; and “The Mind and Heart of Zeus in Hesiod,” ABG 38 (1995) 34–47.
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circumstances of a particular moment rather than an absolute, timeless kind of knowledge. 16
As we look forward to Apollo and Hermes, we will see that the
key distinction between the knowledge of εἰδέναι and the understanding that comes from νόος maps nicely onto the way that the
two gods approach the cosmos under Zeus. Where the knowledge of
εἰδέναι evaluates the present in terms of the past (i.e., I have/have
not seen this before), νόος articulates a response to the present for
future action. Where the knowledge of εἰδέναι may represent timeless
truths, νόος embraces the temporary. While the knowledge of εἰδέναι
is comfortable with the familiar where objects fall into their proper
categories, νόος is adept at dealing with the novel where situations
demand different responses than they have in the past.
III. Apollo and εἰδέναι
As we look to HH Apollo, we find clear connections between
the qualities of Apollo and εἰδέναι . Given his exceptional visibility,
he makes a fitting god to connect with this kind of knowledge. The
hymn opens with the whole company of Olympos fixated on his arrival with his shining bow. All gods watch in heightened anxiety to
see what will happen until Leto hangs the bow on a golden peg and
Zeus gives his son a golden cup. As the hymnist attempts to focus
his audience’s attention on Apollo, the visual elements set the stage
for his entrance into the world.
If we think about the narration of Apollo’s birth, we again note
the hymnist’s emphasis on the visual. In contrast to the birth of
other gods, Apollo’s draws the attention of the inhabited world. The
hymnist takes the audience on a twenty-line circuit of the lands that
Leto visits in search of his birthplace. Almost immediately after he is
born, he bursts forth from his swaddling clothes, and when he walks
on the earth, Delos suddenly flowers with gold (135–136). Even as a
newborn god, Apollo’s actions draw the visual attention of the world
that he encounters.
The hymnist draws attention to the visibility of Apollo one last
time as the god leads his new priests to Delphi. He leaps off the
ship, looking like a star that shines at midday, throwing off sparks
and lighting up the sky (440–442). As he enters his oracular shrine,
he lights a flame to make manifest his might (444), and the whole
of Krisa glows with his presence (445). When we deal with Apollo,
we deal with a god who illuminates the world around him. We might
think about Apollo’s importance as an oracular god as one who can
know the future because he is one who is able to bring to light the
unknown. His presence is radiance.
Just as we might link Apollo to εἰδέναι through visual imagery,
so too can we connect him through his altering of the past for the
16
Lesher (above, n.13) 10, suggests that “one knows something over or during a
period of time while one can only realize, notice, or recognize at a particular time,”
assigning νοεῖν to the latter category.
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purpose of the present. In the Pythian section, the hymnist draws attention to the turbulence of the past that becomes stabilized through
the god’s intervention. Sent by the spring Telphousa, who wishes to
maintain preeminence over her site, Apollo arrives at Krisa and encounters Pytho, whom he summarily dispatches. Given the inset tale
of Typhaon, which occupies 52 of the 76 lines devoted to Apollo’s
exploits against Pytho, we are encouraged to see Apollo’s ephebic
urge (eliminating threatening female figures) as a reflection and extension of Zeus’ method of installing order to the cosmos. 17 Just as
Zeus must banish Typhaon in the Theogony as a final test of order
versus disorder, so too must Apollo eliminate Pytho. 18 In doing so,
he ensures that it will be safe for mortals to come and access Zeus’
will. The turbulence of the past comes to a close as Apollo ushers
in a more stable environment for mortals.
When he eliminates his foes, he takes on new names. Following
Apollo’s insults to Pytho, the hymnist informs us, ἐξ οὗ νῦν Πυθὼ
κικλήσκεται, οἱ δὲ ἄνακτα / Πύθειον καλέουσιν (“From this [rotting
of the monster], now the place is called Pytho; people call the lord
by the name Pythian,” 372–373).
After Apollo has buried Telphousa in rubble as revenge, the
hymnists tells us, ἔνθα δ᾽ ἄνακτι / πάντες ἐπίκλησιν Τελφουσίῳ
εὐχετόωνται, / οὕνεκα Τελφούσης ἱερῆς ᾔσχυνε ῥέεθρα (“There,
they all pray to the lord using the epithet Telphousian, because he
disgraced the streams of holy Telphousa,” 385–387).
A bit later in the hymn, Apollo dons his final epithet, Delphinian, when he tells the Cretan sailors he has abducted to remove their
gear, construct an altar, and pray to him (496). Before doing this,
Apollo makes it clear to the sailors that they must abandon their
previous way of life.
ξεῖνοι, τοὶ Κνωσὸν πολυδένδρεον ἀμφινέμεσθε
τὸ πρίν, ἀτὰρ νῦν οὐκέθ’ ὑπότροποι αὖτις ἔσεσθε
ἔς τε πόλιν ἐρατὴν καὶ δώματα καλὰ ἕκαστος
ἔς τε φίλας ἀλόχους, ἀλλ’ ἐνθάδε πίονα νηόν
ἕξετ’ ἐμὸν πολλοῖσι τετιμένον ἀνθρώποισιν . . .
βουλάς τ’ ἀθανάτων εἰδήσετε τῶν ἰότητι
αἰεὶ τιμήσεσθε διαμπερὲς ἤματα πάντα.

				

(475–479; 484–485)

Strangers, who used to dwell around deeply wooded
Knossos, that was before, but now you, to the man,
will no longer be returning again to your lovely city,
beautiful homes, and dear wives. But here, you will keep
my rich temple, honored by many people. . . . You will
17
For a larger discussion of Apollo and the ephebic urge, see N. Felson, “Epinician Apollo in Story Time: Pythian 9, Olympian 6, and Pythian 3,” in Apolline Politics
and Poetics, eds. L. Athanassaki, R. Martin, and J. Miller (Athens 2009) 149–68.
18
For a more in depth discussion of variations between the Hesiodic version of
Typhon and the version here, see Clay (above, n.3) 30–33.
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know the plans of the gods. By the will of them, you
will always be honored continuously for all your days.
Through these epithets, Apollo reminds us of how his actions in the
past impact the present world that we occupy. With each new epithet,
we are reminded of the world before Apollo. There was a time when
Pytho held the lands near Delphi, but now ( ἐξ οὗ νῦν ) she lives on
in the name of a place and the god who slew her. Telphousa once
flowed from her copious spring, but as a result of Apollo ( ἔνθα δ᾽ ),
her name belongs to Apollo. The Cretan sailors previously ( τὸ πρίν )
went about their business as merchants and husbands, but now ( ἀτὰρ
νῦν ) they have abandoned that life forever in order to be his priests,
worshipping him by a name that recalls his appearance to them as
a dolphin. 19 When we call upon Apollo as Pythian, Telphousian, or
Delphinian, we are invited to share in our knowing ( εἰδέναι ) the
glorious deeds of the god.
Finally, we may connect Apollo to εἰδέναι through the notion of
timelessness that one may equate with gnomic uses of εἰδέναι . When
the young god bursts from his swaddling clothing, he proclaims: εἴη
μοι κίθαρίς τε φίλη καὶ καμπύλα τόξα, / χρήσω τ᾽ ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς
νημερτέα βουλήν (“May the dear kithara and curved bow be mine. I

will prophesy the unerring plan of Zeus to mortals,” 131–132). Rather
than negotiating for the lyre, bow, and prophecy, he proclaims these
τιμαί by fiat. In doing so, he asserts his special prerogative to these
without acknowledging potential counterclaims (e.g., previous owners
of Delphi). 20 He may understand himself as a god of several τιμαί ,
but, as becomes clear through his acquisition of titles, he understands
himself as the god of these τιμαί . 21 By bypassing other claimants,
Apollo ignores history and creates a timeless link between himself
and the lyre, bow, and prophecy. It becomes difficult to think of these
τιμαί without drawing an immediate link to Apollo.
The frequent use of the adverb αἰεὶ in HH Apollo should also link
Apollo to the gnomic qualities of εἰδέναι . Just as gnomic knowledge
19
In discussing the choice of the Cretan sailors as priests rather than local recruits,
A. Miller (From Delos to Delphi: A Literary Study of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo
[Leiden 1986] 97) remarks, “We must conclude that [Apollo] regards the consequent
deracination and forced retirement from ordinary human concerns as a positive advantage, promoting in the ministers a disinterested and single-minded devotion to their
office.” When we deal with Apollo, we are always faced with a god who bestows
benefits to those he favors and harm to those who impede his goals.
20
We might think particularly of the tradition that passes the Delphic oracle down
from Earth to Themis, to Phoibe, and then finally to Apollo (see Aiskhylos’ Eumenides
1–8, Pindar frag. 55, Euripides’ Iphigeneia in Tauris 1259–1269). Interestingly, the transition from previous owners to Apollo is usually violent, with Aiskhylos as an interesting
outlier. For discussion on the historicity of this progression of Delphic prophetic deities,
see C. Sourvinou-Inwood, “Myth as History: The Previous Owners of the Delphic Oracle”
in J. Bremmer, ed. Interpretations of Greek Mythology (Totowa, N.J., 1986) 215–41.
21
A. Miller (above, n.19) 54, comments on the poet’s choice to have Apollo
make this claim rather than narrating it through the poet’s own voice. The result is
that “the poet shows that Apollo is aware of his own complex diversity from his first
moments of conscious being.” We must also keep in mind the consequences of Apollo’s
self-aware diversity, namely the elimination of competing alternatives.
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pertains to all ages, Apollo’s actions are presented as everlasting.
Of the seventeen occurrences of the word in the Homeric Hymns,
thirteen are found in HH Apollo. As Apollo begins to establish altars and sanctuaries (248, 288, 497), he proclaims these as sites that
will always exist. The hymnist reinforces the enduring qualities of
the god, one of those who live forever ( αἰειγενέτης ), by linking the
mythic past with the festive present. Through the festival, we are
encouraged to reflect on the permanence of the changes instituted
by Apollo in the past.
At the same time, the permanence of Apollo is not only announced by the god himself. During the negotiations between Delos
and Leto, αἰεὶ plays an important role. Leto reminds Delos of her
impoverished state before offering her the opportunity to be the home
of one of her son’s most important sanctuaries, where the smell of
sacrifice will always spring up (58–59). In response, Delos expresses
her reservations about accepting the offer. Her fear is not just that
she will be kicked over by Apollo, but that she will always remain
this way (74). As a guarantee of protection, she demands from Leto
an oath, and Leto says,
ἴστω νῦν τάδε Γαῖα καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν
καὶ τὸ κατειβόμενον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ, ὅς τε μέγιστος
ὅρκος δεινότατός τε πέλει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν
ἦ μὴν Φοίβου τῇδε θυώδης ἔσσεται αἰεὶ
βωμὸς καὶ τέμενος, τίσει δέ σέ γ᾽ ἔξοχα πάντων .

					

(84–88)

Let the earth and the broad sky above now know
these things, and the flowing water of Styx, which
is the greatest and most terrible oath for the blessed
gods: Here there will always be an altar smelling of
incense and sanctuary of Phoibos. He will honor you
exceedingly above all.
As Leto swears the most binding of oaths, one that is meant to assure eternal benefits upon the island, she opens with an appeal to
Earth, Sky, and the water of Styx to know ( ἴστω ) her promise. 22
These primordial deities are to bear witness to the privileged status
of Delos among the sanctuaries of Apollo, a status that will forever
improve the productivity of the impoverished island. Like Earth,
Sky, and Styx, the hymn’s audience continues to see and know the
changes that HH Apollo narrates. We are reminded of the continuous
link between the past and the present, and in recalling the history of
Apollo’s major sanctuaries, we are encouraged to view this history
as one of stability. 23
22
Though fragmentary, Arkhilokhos 113.9 seems to use εἰδέναι to set up a similar
point of timeless knowledge. See also Arkhilokhos 67.3.
23
M. Detienne (“This is Where I Intend to Build a Glorious Temple,” Arion 4
[1996–1997] 1–27) sees stability/fixedness in the use of βαίνειν to describe Apollo’s
actions. “The gesture of bainein also implies a certain static dimension: ‘setting one’s
foot’ has a static connotation that is conveyed by a series of words derived from the
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IV. An Alternative Path to τιμαί : The Work of νόος
From the opening of HH Hermes, it is clear that a strong contrast is being developed between Hermes and his half-brother Apollo.
Whereas Apollo’s birth is exceptionally visible, creating permanent
change in the world (e.g., Delos becomes anchored), Hermes’ birth
aligns the young god with the work of νόος , which conceals/encodes
and demands deciphering. The hymnist tells his audience,
μακάρων δὲ θεῶν ἠλεύαθ᾽ ὅμιλον
ἄντρον ἔσω ναίουσα παλίσκιον, ἔνθα Κρονίων
νύμφῃ ἐϋπλοκάμῳ μισγέσκετο νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ,
ὄφρα κατὰ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἔχοι λευκώλενον Ἥρην,
λήθων ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς θνητούς τ᾽ ἀνθρώπους.

						(5–9)

[Maia] shunned the company of the blessed gods,
dwelling inside her thickly shaded cave. There Kronion was mingling with the well-tressed nymph in
the dark of night, while sweet sleep took hold of
white-armed Hera. He escaped the notice of immortal
gods and mortal men.
The description of Hermes’ birth establishes the challenge he
will present to the knowledge of εἰδέναι with its emphasis on the
visual. His mother avoids the gaze of the other gods, keeping to
her shadowy cave, 24 and the conditions of his conception escape the
notice of the world. Unlike Apollo’s birth, which drew the attention
of the world, Hermes’ birth is known only to his mother and father.
The major project of this hymn is then how the unknown Hermes
will make himself visible and thus become known.
The hymnist also quickly asserts a direct connection between
Hermes and the capacity of νόος .
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ μεγάλοιο Διὸς νόος ἐξετελεῖτο,
τῇ δ᾽ ἤδη δέκατος μεὶς οὐρανῷ ἐστήρικτο,
εἴς τε φόως ἄγαγεν, ἀρίσημά τε ἔργα τέτυκτο .

					

(10–12)

same root: belos meaning threshold, bema meaning tribune, the place to which an orator
steps up, to speak; embas or bêla meaning a shoe or sandals; bebêlos, a trampled space,
sometimes with sense of ‘profane’; or bebaios, whatever is solid, securely placed (11).”
Apollo sanctions and upholds boundaries, as M. Chappell (“The Homeric Hymn to Apollo:
The Question of Unity” in A. Faulkner, ed. The Homeric Hymns: Interpretative Essays
[Oxford 2011] 59–81) has reminded us in connection with Apollo’s role in the Iliad (77).
See especially Il. 21.461–467, where Apollo refuses to fight with his Olympian elder. We
might also keep in mind versions of this myth that involve Delos as a floating island
until it becomes fixed in connection with Apollo’s birth. For sources of this myth, see
F. Wehrli, “Leto” in Realencyclopädie Pauly-Wissowa Suppl. V. (Munich 1931) 555–76.
24
In discussing the reasons why Maia avoids the company of the gods, E. Greene
(“Revising Illegitimacy: The Use of Epithets in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes,” CQ
55 [2005] 343–49) has drawn attention to Hermes’ maternal ancestry of rebellion.
He is a child of Maia, daughter of Atlas and granddaughter of Iapetos, who shares
Tartaros’ gloom with Kronos.
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But when the mind of great Zeus was fulfilled, then
the tenth month was fixed in the sky, and Zeus brought
him into the light. Remarkable deeds were done.

Reflecting on Zeus’ νόος , Warden has pointed out that Zeus
“with his noos is able to see and comprehend the pattern of events,
past, present, and future. But his role is not passive . . . he does not
merely comprehend the pattern of events, he molds and fashions it.”25
It is not enough for Zeus to understand the overarching construction
of his cosmos as it has been established. He conceives with Maia a
god who, like himself, will apply his νόος in order to refashion the
world. 26 Unlike Apollo, who lays claim to τιμαί by appropriating the
property of others, Hermes invents new uses for the already existing
world. In so doing, he is able to craft for himself a space within
the Olympian order to operate without wholly displacing those who
have come before him.
The hymnist provides an illustration of this process as soon as
Hermes leaves his mother’s cave, intent on stealing Apollo’s cattle.
Though he has a clear goal in mind, Hermes quickly becomes distracted
by the random appearance of a tortoise, which will soon become a
lyre. Accounts of Hermes’ cattle raid usually mention the invention
of the lyre, but this usually happens after the cattle have been taken
from Apollo. 27 As S. Shelmerdine suggests, this reversal urges us to
reorient our thinking about the myth. 28 Rather than supplanting Apollo
by stealing his property, the hymnist wishes to focus our attention
on the ultimate friendship of the two young gods, facilitated by the
charm of the lyre. 29
J. R. Warden, “The Mind of Zeus,” Journal of the History of Ideas 32 (1971) 7–8.
We should keep in mind that it is Hermes to whom Zeus will turn when he
needs to instill νόος in future creations. In the Works and Days, Zeus has Hermes
provide Pandora with a κύνεόν νόον (67). Aisopos (Chambry 120) has Hermes giving
νόος to men at the behest of Zeus. F. M. Cornford (“Hermes-Nous and Pan-Logos
in Pindar, Ol. II,” CR 26 [1912] 180–81) suggests that a connection should be made
between Hermes and νοῦς at the end of Pindar Olympian 2.
27
ScholD Il. 15.256 follows HH Hermes with invention of the lyre followed by cattle
theft. In Sophokles’ Ikhneutai (Radt fr. 314.284–331) and ps.-Apollodoros’ Bibliotheca
3.10.2, the stolen cattle provide the hide for the later invention of the lyre. Other brief
or fragmentary accounts of this myth include the Hesiodic Megalai Ehoiai, Antoninos
Liberalis’ Metamorphoses 23, Pausanias 7.20.4, and Nonnos’ Dionysiaka 1.337–340.
28
S. Shelmerdine, “Hermes and the Tortoise: A Prelude to Cult,” GRBS 25
(1984) 202.
29
In discussing Apollo’s acquisitions in HH Apollo, A. Bergren (“Sacred Apostrophe: Re-presentation and Imitation in Homeric Hymn to Apollo and Homeric Hymn
to Hermes,” in Weaving Truth: Essays on Language and the Female in Greek Thought.
[Washington, D.C., 2008] 131–60) argues, “The territorial epithets ‘Pythian’ and
‘Telphousian’ reflect not ‘proper’ naming, but the taking of another’s ‘property.’ Apollo’s
name/place is stolen property, just as the cattle Hermes stole were Apollo’s ‘proper
name.’ By exposing his ‘own’ as originally ‘other,’ Apollo’s theft denies any stable,
originary opposition between the terms: the opposition is imposed out of a desire for
ownership, but all we can ‘own’ is the property of another (155).” Hermes will exploit
this, but instead of displacing his brother and becoming ‘Apollonian’ Hermes, he will
invite his half-brother into an enduring relationship.
25

26
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Throughout the tortoise episode, we are confronted with a world
that does not add up neatly if we are relying primarily on what we
see on the exterior of the tortoise. Even before we hear Hermes’
reaction, the hymnist describes the movement of the tortoise as
“walking with a swagger in its feet” (28: σαῦλα ποσὶν βαίνουσα ).
Though not made explicit, the hymnist hints at the future association
of the tortoise-lyre with festive dancers. 30 We are presented with a
contradiction (slow-moving herbivore ~ fleet-footed feasters), and we
must move beyond our knowledge of what tortoises have always been
in order to understand what Hermes plans to do with this tortoise.
Hermes establishes with his first word that the tortoise is something
that will require an application of νόος . Referring to the tortoise as a
σύμβολον , he acknowledges that there is more to it than its outward
appearance would suggest. The external visual stimulus of the σύμβολον
demands a response, and it is the job of the νόος to determine how
we should respond to an unexpected find, just as Hermes does here in
transforming the living tortoise into the resonating chamber of his lyre.
As he continues to address the tortoise, Hermes presents us with
a series of contradictions. As a child of νόος, he proves himself adept
at bringing together contradictory images. He says to the tortoise,
χαῖρε, φυὴν ἐρόεσσα, χοροιτύπε δαιτὸς ἑταίρη,
ἀσπασίη προφανεῖσα. πόθεν τόδε καλὸν ἄθυρμα,
αἰόλον ὄστρακον ἕσσο, χέλυς ὄρεσι ζώουσα

					

(31–33)

Welcome, you lovely in shape, beating the ground in
dance, companion of the feast, a glad tiding. Where
did you get this beautiful plaything, this dappled shell
that clothes you, tortoise dwelling in the mountains?
This lumbering herbivore is suddenly transported into the swift
dancing of the feast. The tortoise’s shell, a necessary defense against
the outside world, is understood by the crafty god as an ἄθυρμα , a
plaything. Rather than seeing the shell as an integral part of the living
tortoise, Hermes recasts it as a glittering adornment. 31 Remembering
that the hymnist has already prepared us for the transformation of this
tortoise into a lyre, we are put in a position to admire how quickly
Hermes can craft a new context for thinking about tortoises. 32
30
See Euripides’ Kyklops 40 where Silenos speaks of his comrades as σαυλούμενοι
as part of Bakkhos’ entourage, and Aristophanes’ Wasps 1173, where Philokleon refers
to his dancing as σαυλοπρωκτιᾶν .
31
Though αἰόλον is appropriate for the dappled nature of the tortoise’s shell, it
should be pointed out that this adjective is often associated with swift animals (cf.
Il. 12.167, of wasps, and Il. 19. 404 of horses). As M. Detienne and J. P. Vernant
(Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, tr. J. Lloyd. [Sussex 1978] 19)
note, “Even if it is true that aiólos applied, for example, to the horse of Achilles, a
bay with white socks, applies to the colour of its coat, the fact is that for the lexicographers and scholiasts who commented on the term it conveyed, first and foremost,
the image of turbulent movement, of incessant change.”
32
In lines 17–23, the hymnist sets out the series of events in Hermes’ first days
(plays lyre at midday and steals Apollo’s cattle at night).
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At this stage, it may seem that the future success of Hermes rests
in his ability to envision what will happen better than Apollo was able
to do when Telphousa sent him away, but we must acknowledge a key
difference between the gods that emerges in Hermes’ final words to
the tortoise. Echoing the Hesiodic proverb, Hermes tells the tortoise
that it is better to be inside since the outside world is dangerous (36).
He does so right before he will disembowel the tortoise and transform
it into a lyre. The issue at stake is what Hermes means when he says
βέλτερον (better for the tortoise to come inside or better for Hermes
if the tortoise comes inside). As we have already seen, the hymnist
encourages us to understand the ambiguous and contradictory nature
of the tortoise. The tortoise is a creature tied to the earth, and yet
with its domed shell above and below, it can remind us of the whole
cosmos (earth, sky, and the underworld). It simultaneously conjures the
image of a particular, fixed point and the whole of the universe. 33 It
is not surprising then that Hermes might employ the Hesiodic proverb
in an ambiguous way in dealing with tortoise.
We can also see an important contrast between Hermes and
Apollo here. If we think back to Apollo’s dealings with the Cretan
sailors, there is a marked emphasis on the split between their former
lives and their future as priests of Apollo. Thanks to the prophetic
gods, these men will hereafter be known as his priests, removed from
other careers that might muddy our understanding of their place in
the cosmos. In contrast, even as Hermes deprives this tortoise of its
life, he is careful to remind us of two simultaneous benefits of the
tortoise (37–38: charm against witchcraft and charmer). The tortoise
has a role to play in both life and death, and Hermes is careful to
link these two capacities. Hermes may institute a split (literally here
by severing the tortoise from its shell), but, as L. Kahn suggests, the
split does not reveal tension, a tear, or strife. 34 Instead, Hermes’ split
ultimately aims towards integration. 35 Even before Hermes embarks
on the cattle raid, he has created a new potential for tortoises that
will aid him in integrating himself into the Olympian order through
friendship with Apollo.
As Hermes embarks on transforming the tortoise, the hymnist reminds us of the importance of νόος when dealing with the crafty god.
If it is the function of νόος, as noted above, to reveal “the significance
33
D. Jaillard (above, n.6) suggests: autour d’elle se tissent des liens complexes
entre les different “étages” du cosmos, et entre les “qualités” contraires qui leur correspondent (“around it are woven the complex connections between the different ‘levels’
of the cosmos and between the contrary ‘qualities’ which correspond to them” 170).
Jaillard goes on to remind us that the earthbound tortoise is also the constellation Lyra.
34
L. Kahn, Hermès passe ou les ambiguïtés de la communication (Paris 1978) 95:
ce n’est pas la scission que révèlent ces tensions, ce n’est pas la déchirure ni l’Eris.
35
L. Kahn (above, n.34) pushes us to see an important distinction between Hermes
and another of Apollo’s common contrasting gods, Dionysos: si Dionysos est l’Autre,
Hermès est simplement l’altérité incertaine; si Dionysos détroit la norme, Hermès la
bouscule pour la reconstruire aussitôt (“if Dionysos is the Other, Hermes is simply
uncertain alterity; if Dionysos destroys the norm, Hermes jostles it to reconstruct it
immediately,” 184).
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of something that becomes clear upon looking at it,” 36 then it should
not be surprising that the hymnist compares the process of turning a
tortoise into lyre with a swift thought ( ὠκὺ νόημα ) passing through
the chest of a worried man (43–44). Hermes has successfully moved
beyond the external features of the tortoise in order to understand
its charming potential. He has combined the tortoise shell with other
once-living materials (cowhide, sheep gut, and reeds) in order to
give all of these a voice in death, again calling into question the
established norms.
V. Reacting to the World of Hermes’ νόος
Later on, the hymnist gives us the opportunity to consider
exactly how Apollo reacts to the disruptive tendencies of Hermes’
νόος . Hermes understands that he has the power to confound those
who try to understand him through conventional methods, especially
the clues that one can observe through sight. When his mother accosts him about his nighttime activities and suggests that Apollo will
treat him roughly (157–158), Hermes is quick to scold his mother
for thinking of him like a child who knows little evil (164: παῦρα
μετὰ φρεσὶν αἴσυλα οἶδεν ). He is confident that Apollo will find
something different and greater if he should come looking for him
(177). In both of these instances, Hermes demands that his mother
see him for more than he appears. Though he looks like a baby,
the crafty god is more than he seems. Only a few days old, he has
managed to steal Apollo’s cattle without being noticed by the guard
dogs. It is not enough to be keen-sighted and vigilant when dealing
with Hermes. 37 One must be able to see beyond the surface in order
to anticipate how one should react.
When we turn to the actual theft of the cattle, it becomes very
clear that Hermes seeks to disrupt the expected signs by altering the
appearance of the tracks left by him and the cattle. He twists the cattle
around so the tracks look as if the cattle have headed back toward
the meadow, and he fabricates sandals for himself out of tamarisk
and myrtle that will disguise his own footprints. As we observed with
the invention of the lyre, the crafty god once again multiplies the
uses of the objects of the world. He is able to improvise and find
new uses for preexisting items.
At the same time, we should carefully read the line that qualifies
the sandals. The hymnist emphasizes the fact that the sandals that will
alter Hermes’ own tracks have not ever been spoken about or thought
about (80: ἄφραστ᾽ ἠδ᾽ ἀνόητα). These sandals are the perfect weapon
in Hermes’ arsenal for confounding Apollo, who, as the following
scenes reveal, relies heavily upon the familiar world that he has come
B. Snell 1960 (above, n.11) 53.
M. Detienne and J. P. Vernant (above, n.31) have pointed to an important contrast between Kronos and Zeus in the Theogony (80). Whereas Kronos, who is always
on the lookout (466: ἀλαοσκοπιὴν ἔχεν, ἀλλὰ δοκεύων ), is deceived by Rhea, Zeus is
able to banish Typhon because he is able to perceive the threat through his νόος (838).
36
37
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to know ( εἰδέναι). Improvising a way to disguise his tracks, Hermes
creates something that has no previous history. 38
We should also note that these sandals are temporary; Hermes is
quick to discard them as soon as he has finished his business with the
cattle (139). In contrast to Apollo, who insists upon the permanence
of the sanctuaries he institutes (HH Apollo 248, 288, 497), Hermes
understands the usefulness of his inventions for specific, temporary
purposes. He has not crafted the first sandal upon which all future
sandals will be modeled. 39 Rather than taking the long view of the
way that the past will persist indefinitely, Hermes is able to envision
a possible use of tamarisk and myrtle without insisting that this is
the way to use them. In making the unthinkable ( ἀνόητα ) sandals
thinkable, Hermes creates a more flexible way to approach these
materials. 40
When Apollo later comes upon the tracks of his cattle and Hermes’
sandals, the hymnist makes an interesting distinction. Apollo initially
takes note of the tracks (218: ἴχνιά τ᾽ εἰσενόησεν ), and he remarks,
ὦ πόποι, ἦ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ᾽ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι
ἴχνια μὲν τάδε γ᾽ ἐστὶ βοῶν ὀρθοκραιράων,
ἀλλὰ πάλιν τέτραπται ἐς ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα.
					
(219–221)

Oh, my! I see this great wonder with my eyes. These
here are the tracks of my straight-horned cattle, but
they are turned back towards the asphodel meadow.
All three times that Apollo employs his νόος in this hymn, he
deals with familiar visible signs. Here he draws upon his experience
and immediately identifies the tracks as those of his cattle. He is in
no way fooled by them though he must admit that it is a wonder
that the tracks point to where the cows have come from, reversing
the normal order of things. His νόος operates successfully so long
as he deals with the realm of what he knows.
When we hear Apollo try to explain the tracks left by Hermes’
sandals, the situation changes radically. Though Apollo’s νόος is able
to process the tracks as traces of the thief, it becomes clear that it is
deficient when dealing with novelties. Looking at the tracks, Apollo says,
38
Interestingly, the hymnist employs words (ἄφραστος and ἀνόητος) used minimally
in Homer, Hesiod, or the Homeric Hymns. This is the only occurrence of ἀνόητος .
Of the three uses of ἄφραστος , two occur in HH Hermes (here and 353), and one is
found in a fragment of Hesiod (fr. 239 MW)
39
See HH Hermes 57 where Maia is described as prettily sandaled (καλλιπέδιλον).
40
The permanence and fixity that is associated with Apollo is problematic
for Hermes. Within the hymn, we might look to 178–81 where Hermes threatens to
steal the temple goods from Delphi. As D. Jaillard (above, n.6) suggests, libérait les
dépôts figés, fixés. Les biens qui l’intéressent sont ceux qui s’échangent, qui circulent
(“Hermes will free the frozen, fixed deposits. The goods which interest him are those
which are exchanged, which circulate” 91). In discussing the cattle themselves, Jaillard
reminds us that Hermes reconfigures the immortality of the cows by introducing them
to procreation. Rather than individuals living on permanently, the herd will continue
to exist as a result of countless generations of temporary cattle (143).
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βήματα δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀνδρὸς τάδε γίνεται οὔτε γυναικός
οὔτε λύκων πολιῶν οὔτ᾽ ἄρκτων οὔτε λεόντων
οὔτε τι κενταύρου λασιαύχενος ἔλπομαι εἶναι,
ὅς τις τοῖα πέλωρα βιβᾷ ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισιν.
					
(222–225)

These tracks belong neither to man, nor woman, nor
grey wolves, nor bears, nor lions. Nor do I expect at
all that they are those of a shaggy-throated centaur,
whoever walks such monstrous steps on his fleeting feet.
When confronted with something that he has not seen before,
something he cannot know ( εἰδέναι ), Apollo is unable to provide a
positive description of what he sees. Instead, he resorts to denying
that they belong to the categories of the likely culprits for his missing
cattle (men, women, wolves, bears, lions, or centaurs). If he could
track his cattle to one of these particular culprits, he would presumably
know how to respond to the situation, but because Hermes is able
to confound the usual sight clues, he has an advantage over Apollo,
ensuring that Apollo will need the help of Zeus to get the cattle back.
The contrast between Hermes, skilled in the shifting ways of
νόος , and Apollo, reliant upon the past experience of εἰδέναι , is at
the heart of the episode with the Old Man of Onkhestos. The only
mortal character in the hymn, the Old Man occupies an interesting
mediating role between the two gods. From the very beginning of
the encounter, we need to recognize that the Old Man understands
something deeper about the baby thief working his way up the road
with backwards cattle. Presented with an unusual sight, the Old Man’s
νόος is set in motion (87: ἐνόησε ) in order to figure out how to respond. We have already seen how Hermes frequently confounds the
visual world that Apollo is committed to, and here he encourages the
Old Man to think outside the established categories, καί τε ἰδὼν μὴ
ἰδὼν εἶναι καὶ κωφὸς ἀκούσας, / καὶ σιγᾶν, ὅτε μή τι καταβλάπτῃ
τὸ σὸν αὐτοῦ (“Though seeing, don’t be seeing, and be deaf though

hearing. Be quiet since you aren’t in any way being harmed as far
as your stuff goes,” 92–93).
Presenting paradoxical images (a baby stealing cattle, cattle walking
backwards), Hermes urges the Old Man to embrace the opportunity
to occupy contrary positions simultaneously. He has an opportunity
to become like the lyre that established Hermes’ way of approaching
the world early in the hymn. Whereas the lyre sings in death, the Old
Man is told to repress those faculties we associate with the living.
So long as he accepts this request, he will be able to aid Hermes
in evading Apollo, who, as we will see, relies upon precisely these
faculties in order to understand what has happened to his cattle. 41
41
When Hermes later replies to Apollo’s demand to be shown the cattle, he
asserts that he cannot help Apollo because he has not seen, learned about, or heard
about the cattle (263: οὐκ ἴδον, οὐ πυθόμην, οὐκ ἄλλου μῦθον ἄκουσα ).
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When Apollo finds the Old Man toiling away, he asks a simple
question about whether or not he has seen a man with the cattle
(199–200: ὄπωπας / ἀνέρα ταῖσδ᾽ ἐπὶ βουσὶ ), and this puts the Old
Man in a tricky position. Technically he has seen the cattle thief, but
contrary to expectation, the cattle thief was not a man, but a small
child. Whereas Apollo is looking for firm information about what
has been seen, the Old Man, heeding Hermes’ warning, talks about
the difficulties of sight, noting that “it is difficult to say everything
one sees with the eyes” (202–203: ἀργαλέον μέν, ὅσ᾽ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
ἴδοιτο, / πάντα λέγειν ). Past experience will not be enough to understand what has occurred on this day, and the Old Man’s response
sets up an important contrast,
παῖδα δ᾽ ἔδοξα, φέριστε, σαφὲς δ᾽ οὐκ οἶδα, νοῆσαι,
ὅς τις ὁ παῖς ἅμα βουσὶν ἐϋκραίρῃσιν ὀπήδει
νήπιος, εἶχε δὲ ῥάβδον, ἐπιστροφάδην δ᾽ ἐβάδιζεν.
ἐξοπίσω δ᾽ ἀνέεργε, κάρη δ᾽ ἔχον ἀντίον αὐτῷ.

					

(208–211)

I thought I noticed a kid—I do not know for sure—some
kid following the broad-horned cattle, an innocent one.
He held a staff. He walked back and forth, and he was
driving them backward. They kept their heads facing him.
In the course of one line, the Old Man makes a contrast between
firm knowledge, rooted in past experience ( σαφὲς δ᾽ οὐκ οἶδα ), and
the unstable world that the νόος must interpret ( παῖδα δ᾽ ἔδοξα . . .
νοῆσαι ). He may explain what it is that he has seen, but this may
not be the kind of information that Apollo was looking for. Apollo is
expecting a clear description of the direction that the man who stole
his cattle has headed, but he receives information about the bizarre
sight of a baby cattle thief driving cows backwards. Past experience
will be insufficient for Apollo to track down his cattle. He will have
to come to terms with his brother who beguiles traditional boundaries.
Though often overlooked, it should be pointed out that it is not
clear that Apollo knows how to proceed since the information provided by the Old Man fails to provide a concrete answer to Apollo’s
question. We cannot say that he knows exactly where to go until he
notices a bird (213: οἰωνὸν δ᾽ ἐνόει τανυσίπτερον ), which he interprets as a sign that Hermes is the thief. As above with the cattle
tracks, Apollo makes use of his νόος in order to decode a source
of knowledge that he is familiar with. Unlike his innovative brother
who can transform the world through νόος , Apollo underutilizes his,
applying it simply to the acquisition of factual knowledge. As B.
Heiden has suggested, Greek mythic poetry is much more interested
in person-to-person relationships than factual information, and Apollo
seems to overlook this point before his reconciliation with Hermes. 42
42
B. Heiden, “Truth and Personal Agreement in Archaic Greek Poetry: The
Homeric Hymn to Hermes,” Philosophy and Literature 34 (2010) 413. Heiden later
emphasizes the importance of the personal relationship in his reading of the discussions
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He may be able to identify Hermes as the thief through an application
of his νόος, but this information is insufficient in retrieving the cattle
since Hermes’ νόος is much more adept at changing the landscape
as the situation requires.
The hymnist has successfully set up a tension between Hermes,
who reorients the world so there will be a place for him in the future, and Apollo, who is committed to the way the world has always
appeared. As the hymn shifts towards the future reconciliation of the
brothers, the hymnist emphasizes the ways in which Hermes is able
to confound knowledge based on appearance, but this is not simply
to negate altogether the value of past knowledge embodied by Apollo.
We must remember that the hymn ends with the harmonious union
of Hermes and Apollo thanks to the intervention of Zeus. Through
the respective energies of Hermes (future-oriented νόος ) and Apollo
(past-oriented εἰδέναι), we can come to a fuller understanding of Zeus.
VI. The Trouble with Appearances
As Apollo bursts into Maia’s cave, Hermes notices (ἐνόησε ) that
he is angry about the cows (235–236). Perceiving through his νόος
the need to respond to the impending attack from Apollo, Hermes is
careful to alter his appearance so that he can claim he is an innocent baby. When Apollo demands that he be shown the cattle (254:
μήνυέ ) after a failed search to find them, Hermes willingly plays into
Apollo’s reliance upon visual evidence. As he says, “I have not seen/
do not know, nor learned about, nor heard a tale from anyone” (263:
οὐκ ἴδον, οὐ πυθόμην, οὐκ ἄλλου μῦθον ἄκουσα ). Hermes echoes
his request to the Old Man (“Though seeing, don’t be seeing, and
be deaf though hearing.”) as he denies that he is likely to have the
information that Apollo is requesting. He even insists that he simply
does not look the part (265: οὐδὲ βοῶν ἐλατῆρι κραταιῷ φωτὶ ἔοικα),
requiring Apollo to recognize him as a simple and harmless baby
(268–269; 273–274). Because Apollo is not as proficient in his νόος
with the unfamiliar, Hermes is able to stymie him by exploiting his
own contradictory nature (simultaneously a baby and a cattle thief). 43
Though Apollo may threaten to banish Hermes, he will not regain
his cattle unless he can overcome his younger brother’s ability to
disguise what should be easy to see.
about prophecy that occur later in the hymn. Those who trust only the birds fail to
engage in a relationship with Apollo, and they subsequently suffer, though Apollo will
gladly accept their sacrifices.
43
O. Vox (“Apollo irato nell’ Inno ad Ermes,” Prometheus 7 [1981] 108–14)
has shown that Apollo seems confused about what to do with Hermes in his threat
to hurl him into Tartaros followed by the threat that Hermes will rule over the Little
People in Hades. The threat of Tartaros is appropriate for immortals, but the threat of
banishment to Hades is more appropriate for mortals (109). In Philostratos, the threat
is only that Apollo will push Hermes under the Earth. L. Kahn (above, n.34) 60–61,
notes that we see a similar confusion between god and mortal in Hermes’ sacrifice
of the cattle. As he creates no hierarchy of gods, he also blurs the clear boundaries
between gods and mortals.
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In setting out his case before father Zeus, Apollo continues to
emphasize the gap between Hermes and the expectations one might
have for what a thief looks like. He shows his frustration in dealing
with the novelty of his younger brother. After describing Hermes
as a mocker like he has never seen among gods or men (338–339),
Apollo recounts the difficulty he has with the tracks left by the cows
and Hermes’ sandals. Though he can describe the tracks left by the
cows in the black dust, he again speaks in qualified terms about the
tracks left by Hermes. That impossible god ( ἀμήχανος ) walks on
neither his hands nor feet (346–347), leaving tracks as if he were
walking on trees (349). Just as Apollo was only able to describe the
sandal tracks earlier in negative terms (not man, woman, wolf, bear,
lion, or centaur), here Apollo can make only an approximation (like
walking on tree branches).
Apollo admits Hermes’ ability to beguile his reliance on visual
clues. He tells his father that so long as Hermes and the cattle walked
along the sand, the tracks remained very distinct (351: διέπρεπεν ). 44
He once again struggles to explain what he has seen when Hermes
and the cattle moved onto solid ground. He tells his father that their
path became indecipherable (353: ἄφραστος ). As when Apollo first
attempted to process what he saw through his νόος , the all-knowing,
prophetic god cannot ascribe the proper terminology for what he has
encountered. So long as there is a clear visual trace, he is able to
track the culprit and his cattle, but when the trace disappears, his
only recourse seems to be to drag the culprit before Zeus in order
that Zeus may bring about resolution.
As we turn to Hermes’ response, we should note that he again
embraces his contradictory nature by insisting that he be viewed as a
simple baby (cf. the use of νήπιος in 210 and 406) while simultaneously proving himself adept at courtroom rhetoric, the mark of a much
older and experienced person. As if to disguise his rhetorical trickery,
Hermes claims that he will speak the truth (368: ἀληθείην), and in so
doing, he appeals to the Greek sense that there is truth in children and
wine. As the gods listen to his defense, they are put in the position of
having to adjust their expectations. Hermes proves his divinity through
the contradictory image of a child well-steeped in rhetorical skill. 45
There can be no denying that Hermes fails to speak ἀληθείην
in his defense, as he omits his own deeds in favor of prefacing his
44
Though compounds of πρέπειν are used elsewhere in early Greek poetry, this
compound is not used elsewhere in Homer, Hesiod, or the Homeric Hymns, again
suggesting the novelty of Hermes. Pindar does use it in Ol. 1.2 in discussing the brilliance of gold like fire. B. Snell (Lexikon above, n.11) notes several uses of πρέπειν
and its compounds with verbs of sight.
45
E. Szepes (“Humour of Homeric Hermes Hymn,” Homonoia 2 [1980] 5–56)
argues that Hermes’ insistence on his status as child is an attempt to extract himself
from the legal process. As a child, he could not be brought to court (43). Given the
early emphasis by the hymnist on Hermes’ desire to gain his rightful place among the
gods (163–181), it seems equally important to understand this trial as an opportunity
for Hermes to win approval from his father.
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defense with Apollo’s misdeeds (370–374). 46 The closest that he comes
to making any statement about his own activity is hedged by the
relationships that he desires to have with the community of the gods.
πείθεο, καὶ γὰρ ἐμεῖο πατὴρ φίλος εὔχεαι εἶναι,
ὡς οὐκ οἴκαδ᾽ ἔλασσα βόας ὡς ὄλβιος εἴην,
οὐδ᾽ ὑπὲρ οὐδὸν ἔβην τὸ δέ τ᾽ ἀτρεκέως ἀγορεύω .

					

(378–380)

Trust me that (you even boast that you are my dear
father) I did not drive the cattle home in order to be
rich.47 I did not cross the threshold. I say this precisely.
Though he is correct to say that he has not driven the cattle
to his home, perhaps the more important issue here is his appeal to
Zeus for trust, strengthening that appeal with his parenthetical appeal to accept the role of Hermes’ father. 48 As will become clearer
in looking at Hermes’ subsequent defense, Hermes is attempting to
shift this trial away from an assessment of the facts, an assessment
of what has or has not happened. He seems to be shifting the discussion away from the past and knowledge of the past (a complete
understanding embodied in ἀλήθεια ) towards a relationship with his
father in the future.
Immediately following his request to Zeus, Hermes asserts that he
respects the gods, loves Zeus, and stands in dreadful awe of Apollo
(381–382). These claims for relationships he would like to have all
preface the most important and most problematic statement in his
defense, namely that he is innocent (383). This speech that should
be without gaps, due to his claim to speak ἀληθείην, fails to address
the question of whether or not he is responsible for Apollo’s missing
cattle. Rather than seeking to make claims that would prove his innocence, Hermes has opted to emphasize his desire to be a welcome
member of the Olympian community in the future.
46
T. Cole (“Archaic Truth,” QUCC 42 [1983] 7–28) argues that ἀλήθεια applies
to people who can speak with “completeness, non-omission of any relevant particular, whether through forgetting or ignoring (10).” R. Prier (Thauma Idesthai: The
Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek. [Tallahassee 1989] 225)
reminds us that this kind of truth provides a “general and unifying affirmation . . .
that provides the ‘whole truth.’” Prier makes a special point to distinguish between
two kinds of Greek truth ( ἐτεός versus ἀλήθεια ). He argues that we should think of
ἐτεός as that which divides the world into a yes-no dichotomy; it is or it is not. In
contrast as suggested above, the emphasis of ἀλήθεια is in its sense of fullness. I
would suggest that this kind of truth may be contradictory if the system that it responds to is in itself contradictory.
47
I diverge from M. L. West (above, n.1) in v.379. If we read ὡς in the last
clause, then Hermes’ response adds one more loophole for him to slip through. If an
opponent can prove that he did drive the cattle home, then he is still left with the
argument that his reasoning was not for the sake of profit.
48
E. Greene (above, n.24) is right to draw attention to the strategic address of
Zeus as ζεῦ πάτερ in 368 (347). This is the first time that Zeus has presumably met
Hermes and vice versa.
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VII. New Relationships
As Heiden has recently argued, it is ultimately Zeus, not the facts
of the case, that prevails. It is Zeus who must make a decision about
what to do with his crafty son. 49 The issue of Hermes’ guilt is set
aside as Zeus urges his sons to resolve their dispute over the cattle.
Whereas HH Apollo focused on the triumphant rise of Apollo at the
expense of older beings, HH Hermes aims ultimately to accommodate
both Apollo, a symbol for Zeus’ cosmos as it has been, and Hermes,
a symbol for what Zeus’ cosmos may become. The hymn ultimately
highlights the interdependence between these two gods. 50
Following Zeus’ laughter, the hymnist informs us,
ἀμφοτέρους δ᾽ ἐκέλευσεν ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντας
ζητεύειν, Ἑρμῆν δὲ διάκτορον ἡγεμονεύειν
καὶ δεῖξαι τὸν χῶρον ἐπ᾽ ἀβλαβίῃσι νόοιο,
ὅππῃ δὴ αὖτ᾽ ἀπέκρυψε βοῶν ἴφθιμα κάρηνα.

					

(391–394)

[Zeus] bid them both to have an equal-minded intention and to search—Hermes, as guide, to lead the way
and to show, without any tricks of his mind, the place
where he hid the stout heads of cattle.
It should be noted that Zeus has not made a pronouncement about
what must be done once Hermes reveals the cattle. Though Hermes
has the capacity to beguile Apollo’s νόος , which has proven insufficient when dealing with the unexpected, Zeus urges his tricky son
to set aside the powerful deceits of his νόος . Through his mediation,
Zeus encourages his sons to set aside their feud and cooperate with
a common purpose ( ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ). 51 The friendship which results
unites insider and outsider, established and novel, what has been with
what may be. Unlike other versions that emphasize conflict, this hymn
focuses ultimately on the union that occurs after the older, established
brother has fully accepted his younger brother into his community. 52
The reconciliation of Zeus’ sons is facilitated by Hermes’ performance on his newly invented lyre. Struck by desire for this novel
B. Heiden (above, n.42) 421.
A. Bergren (above, n.29) 156, suggests that “what the Hymn to Hermes reveals
is the indecidability of the two gods: Apollo’s desire for unique identity is a desire
for what belongs to Hermes, just as Hermes’ desire is for what belongs to Apollo.”
51
The hymnist anticipates this union by his subtle phrasing. As the two gods
approached Olympos, the hymnist explicitly names them both (327: Ἑρμῆς τε καὶ
ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων ). When they leave Olympos, the hymnist unites them, referring
to them as the very beautiful children of Zeus (397: Διὸς περικαλλέα τέκνα ). In this
same passage, the hymnist reinforces their union through the use of the dual.
52
Discussing the ultimate reconciliation of the half-brothers, S. Johnston (above, n.2
2002 and 2003) has drawn attention to parallels between Apollo and the older males of
a community in initiation practices. From the standpoint of initiatory practices, Hermes
stands in clearly for the younger members of the community seeking full acceptance
by the adult community. For the importance of cattle raids in initiatory practice, see
A. Haft, “The Mercurial Significance of Raiding: Baby Hermes and Animal Theft in
Contemporary Crete,” Arion 4 (1996) 27–48.
49
50
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instrument, Apollo questions his brother about its origins, and the
hymnist once again reminds us of the opposition between the two
brothers. He offers two possibilities for how Hermes acquired the
marvelous lyre, reminding us of his connections to the past-oriented
and timeless qualities of εἰδέναι . On the one hand, Hermes may
simply have been born with it (440: ἐκ γενετῆς τάδ’ ἅμ’ ἕσπετο ),
suggesting that it, like Apollo’s τιμαί , is eternally linked to the god.
On the other, he may have received it from a god or mortal as a gift
(442), suggesting that the lyre predates Hermes. As we have seen
elsewhere, Apollo struggles to understand the novel creation, failing
to leave room for the possibility that Hermes himself has refashioned
a tortoise in order to create the lyre that will help him win τιμαί
from his older brother.
Yet there is the sense here that Apollo is beginning to appreciate
the ways that Hermes changes traditional models. Immediately after
offering origins for the lyre, he acknowledges the delightful novelty
of Hermes’ theogony. As he says to his half-brother,
θαυμασίην γὰρ τήνδε νεήφατον ὄσσαν ἀκούω,
ἣν οὔ πώ ποτέ φημι δαήμεναι οὔτε τιν› ἀνδρῶν,
οὔτε τιν› ἀθανάτων οἳ Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχουσι,
νόσφι σέθεν φηλῆτα 53 Διὸς καὶ Μαιάδος υἱέ .

					

(443–446)

Indeed, this is a wonderful [song], previously unuttered, which I hear, a song which I say no one of
men or immortals, who have their homes on Olympos,
has ever yet learned, apart from you, robber son of
Zeus and Maia.
Apollo acknowledges the special status of Hermes who has done
what no one else has done. The tricky god manages to sing something
previously unuttered ( νεήφατον ). 54 He stands apart from anything
that Apollo has experienced up to this point in time, and the result
is delightful wonder. He accepts the legitimate claims of his halfbrother to be a member of the Olympian community, acknowledging
their common father, Zeus. In the past, Apollo was likely to eliminate
his rivals. By eliminating opponents like Pytho and Telphousa, he
was able to reinforce his claim to be the master of the bow, lyre,
and prophecy. After he has interacted with Hermes, beguiled by his
half-brother’s ability to be more than he appears to be and bewitched
by the seductive song of the lyre, Apollo welcomes a rival into a
bond of eternal friendship, promising that no god or mortal will be
dearer to him (523–526).
53
Here I follow T. Allen’s (Homeri Opera Tomus V: Hymnus, Cyclum Fragmenta,
Margiten, Batrachomyomachiam, Vitas Continens. [Oxford 1912]) reading φηλῆτα
rather than M. L. West’s φιλῆτα . In the context of the cattle theft, it seems likely
that Apollo would acknowledge Hermes’ skills here.
54
Again a word not used in Homer, Hesiod, or the Homeric Hymns outside of
this passage.
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This is not a one-way exchange, however. At the same time
that Apollo praises Hermes for his ability to introduce innovation
into the world, Hermes in turn affirms Apollo’s vast knowledge of
what has been. He promises Apollo the opportunity to incorporate
the lyre into his databank of knowledge (466: σήμερον εἰδήσεις ),
which is a fitting offer for Apollo who knows everything well (467:
φρεσὶ πάντ› εὖ οἶδας ). Rather than discrediting the value of Apollo’s
knowledge of the past in favor of endless innovation for the future,
Hermes welcomes the opportunity, as D. Jaillard says, “to substitute
for the notion of order, which implies a certain fixity, the idea of
an ensemble flexibly structured by the play of sharing between powers.” 55 Rather than having clear boundaries between the domains of
Apollo and Hermes, Hermes sees the strength of Zeus’ cosmos in the
interplay between himself and his half-brother, and as a result, they
are joined in eternal friendship, jointly enjoying the lyre’s music as
they herd the cattle together.
VIII. Reconsidering Prophecy: A Practical Application
of the New Relationship
Toward the end of the hymn, the hymnist raises the possibility
that Hermes may also share prophecy with Apollo. If we look at this
scene in relationship to the previous scene in which Hermes welcomed
his brother into the art of the lyre, we hear an interesting echo and
contrast. As noted above, Hermes welcomes Apollo as a fellow musician, and he specifically tells his half-brother that it his prerogative
to learn what he likes (474: σοὶ δ᾿ αὐτάγρετόν ἐστι δαήμεναι ὅττι
μενοινᾷς ). Here toward the end of the hymn, Apollo insists upon his
exclusive right to a form of prophecy that has direct access to the
plan of Zeus, excluding Hermes and all other gods from learning it
(534: οὔτε σε θέσφατόν ἐστι δαήμεναι οὔτε τιν› ἄλλον / ἀθανάτων ).
As a result of the oath he once swore, the system is forever locked
into place with Apollo as the eternal mouthpiece of Zeus. Because
of this exclusive relationship, Apollo can then grant or restrict access to the knowledge of what the father of gods and men has in
mind (541–549). For those who inquire with Apollo in the approved
fashion, listening to the sound of his voice, Apollo can bring great
benefits. For those who seek to gain knowledge beyond his wishes,
he will bring harm, though he will take their goods all the same.
Though the plan of Zeus may be accessible to anyone, it is Apollo
who is in the position to determine who will benefit and who will
be harmed by the knowledge of that plan.
We should also listen to the way that Apollo describes the purpose
of his exclusive prophecy. He indicates that his prophetic work is a
matter of knowing the plan of Zeus (538: εἴσεσθαι Ζηνὸς πυκινόφρονα
βουλήν). Using the future infinitive of εἰδέναι, the hymnist uses Apollo
55
D. Jaillard (above, n.6) 89: Substituer à la notion d’ordre qui implique une
certain fixité, l’idée d’un ensemble flexible structuré par le jeu des partages entre
puissances.
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to present one way of understanding the work of prophecy. As several
scholars have discussed in recent years, prophecy is not an irrational
art, but rather an attempt on the part of mortals to bring order to a
potentially chaotic world. 56 Faced with the uncertainty of the future,
mortals may desire surety that the plans that they have formed in
the past will work out in the future as they have envisioned them.
This may help us understand the role that Apollo’s prophecies play
in sanctioning the establishment of Greek colonies. 57 We might also
look to the famous example from Herodotos’ account of Kroisos. On
the verge of attacking the Persians, the king wants to be sure that
he will succeed. His trust in the Delphic oracle is rooted in its vast
knowledge. The oracle knows not only “the count of the sands and
the measure of the sea” (1.47.3: οἶδα δ᾽ ἐγὼ ψάμμου τ᾽ ἀριθμὸν καὶ
μέτρα θαλάσσης ), but it also knows that the king is at that moment
boiling a tortoise and a lamb in a bronze pot. Because of the extent of
the oracle’s knowledge, Kroisos trusts that the oracle will be correct
about the future. 58 From this view, prophecy is a project that seeks
to constrain and control the unknowable future.
Yet the example of Kroisos suggests that prophecy is not simply
a matter of knowing the future; Kroisos fails to take into account the
notorious ambiguity of the Delphic oracle. Confident that the oracle
refers to the Persians, the Lydian king fails to think that a great
empire may in fact be his own. We might listen more carefully to
the rest of the oracle’s initial reply. Following its claim to know the
seemingly unknowable, the oracle goes on to say that it “understands
the dumb and hears the one who does not speak” ( καὶ κωφοῦ συνίημι,
καὶ οὐ φωνεῦντος ἀκούω ). We seem to be in the contradictory world
of Hermes who told the Old Man not to see though he sees and to
be dumb though he speaks. If we are not careful, we may fail to
understand what it is that the oracles tell us. Rather than providing
factual information that we can interpret through sure and steady
knowledge, the oracles tell us mortals about the plan or intention of
Zeus, and as Heiden suggests, “an intention is not something visible, but an agent’s disposition to make a certain choice affecting a
56
S. Johnston (“Introduction: Divining and Divination” in S. Johnston and P. Struck,
eds., Mantikē: Studies in Ancient Divination [Boston 2005] 11) suggests that “divination
is an utterly human art, behind which one can glimpse not only the rules that participants
have developed for its engagement, but also the rules by which participants assume (or
hope) that the world works.” Along similar lines, W. Burkert (“Signs, Commands, and
Knowledge: Ancient Divination Between Enigma and Epiphany” in Mantikē: Studies in
Ancient Divination [Boston 2005] 30) argues, “Divination is not irrational but rather
an attempt, perhaps a desperate attempt, to extend the realm of ratio, the realms of
knowledge and control, beyond the barrier of the future, and the barrier of death, into
the misty zones from which normal knowledge and experience is absent.”
57
S. Johnston (“Delphic Apollo in the Oresteia,” in Apolline Politics and Poetics
[Athens 2009] 219–28) reminds us that roughly 7.5 percent of Delphic oracles that
we have preserved refer to colonization. Interestingly, given Apollo’s connection to
the past, roughly 10.4 percent deal with calming the spirits of the dead, sometimes
resulting in cult foundations.
58
Recall as well that in Il.6.447, Hektor speaks with certainty (εὖ γὰρ ἐγὼ
τόδε οἶδα) that Troy will fall as if it is a fixed outcome.
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certain situation.” 59 Divination is not about correctly understanding
the one correct answer to the riddle of the oracle so much as it is
about weighing out the possible reactions of the gods to a particular
human action. 60
I would draw our attention briefly to an interesting prophetic
practice in which Apollo and Hermes play essential roles. As F. Graf
has demonstrated, the so-called dice oracles consist of pillars with
fixed responses corresponding to each role of the dice. 61 The oracular
voice must be that of Apollo which leaves Hermes the role of the
mediator, conveying the message to the inquirer in a similar role to
the prophets at Delphi, Didyma, or Klaros. Given the dynamic that
we have seen in HH Hermes between these two gods, these roles
could not be more fitting. The oracular texts predate the inquirer,
and they remain unchanged even after the inquirer has departed. They
comprise a fixed text that one may know ( εἰδέναι ), but knowing the
possible responses is insufficient. It is the presence of Hermes that
provides the variety in responses that would be suitable for a variety
of inquirers. Like νόος which must assess the multivalence of any
given situation, the chance roll of the dice determines which of the
established responses will apply to the current inquirers question.
There is a tension in human thinking that gets focalized through
divination. By having Apollo and Hermes negotiate over prophecy,
the hymnist helps us focus on the struggle between two competing
worldviews. We may want to see the world as established and stable,
one that we can know for sure ( εἰδέναι ), but we may suspect that
the world is more unpredictable than we thought, a world that will
require us to respond through our use of νόος . 62 By extension, the
introduction of Hermes into the Olympian order and the newly formed
friendship with Apollo help us understand something broader about
Zeus himself. Looking at Zeus as the god who rules both αἰθήρ and
ἀήρ , Vernant has suggested, “Those who are submitted to this sovereign power of Zeus feel the effects of its double and contradictory
character. On the one hand this power embodied by the sky, with
its regular movements and the periodic cycle of days and seasons,
represents a just and ordered sovereignty. At the same time, it also
comprises an element of opaqueness and unpredictability.” 63 Over the
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course of the hymn, Apollo comes to respect the unpredictability in the
Olympian cosmos introduced by Hermes. By embracing the shiftiness
of his half-brother, Apollo actually comes to a better understanding
of the full nature of his father.
Rather than HH Hermes being about a neat division of τιμαί
that establishes a clear hierarchy (Apollo, god of cowherding and
lyre music, versus Hermes, god of shepherding and pipe music), the
hymnist very intentionally has the brothers head off with the herd
together. Hermes’ entry into the Olympian order does not restructure
the cosmos at the expense of Apollo, but rather it welcomes the skills
of both gods in harmony. The strength of Zeus is his ability to create
a space in which both Apollo, crafting order in a disorderly world,
and Hermes, constantly opening up new possibilities, can operate
cooperatively. 64
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“Out of the friendship of Ifa and Eshu (like that of Apollo and Hermes at the end of
the Homeric Hymn) we get no tragic opposition, then; we get, rather, the creative play
of necessity and chance, certainty and uncertainty, archetype and ectype, destiny and
its exceptions, the way and the no-way, the net of fate and the escape from that net.”
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